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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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B.

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (5 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682217

16 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 69th Signal Battalion (Army), Period Ending 30 April 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
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69th Signal Battalion (Army)

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3
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 69TH SIGNAL BATTALION (ARMY)
APO San Francisco 96307

SCCVUG-SN-3

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 69th Signal Battalion for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

1. General: This reporting period was opened by the TET offensive and was marked by the restoration and repair of damage suffered during the offensive, and consolidation of existing sites.

a. At the start of the TET Offensive, personnel of this battalion were committed as members of a quick reactionary force in defense of Tan Son Nhut. This task force is credited with stopping three battalions of VC at the western edge of Tan Son Nhut and is largely responsible for keeping the base from being overrun. During the ensuing battle, two (2) personnel were killed and four (4) wounded. As a direct result of that action, one person was awarded the Silver Star posthumously. Twenty-nine (29) personnel were awarded the Bronze Star for Valor, four (4) personnel were awarded the Army Commendation Medal for Valor, and four (4) personnel were awarded the Purple Heart.

b. The battalion experienced no major reorganizational changes during this period. However, relocation and elimination of several sites and responsibilities allowed maximum consolidation and utilization of those personnel assigned.

c. The present for duty strength of the battalion fell from 1120 on 1 February to 792 on 30 April. This reduction is the result of continued personnel losses and minimal replacements. The average present for duty strength during the quarter was 920.

d. This battalion neither conducted nor participated in formal military parades or reviews during this quarter. However, a formal award ceremony was conducted during this period. On 2 April 1968, elements of HQC, A Company, Signal Support and 593d Signal Company participated in a ceremony to present the departing battalion executive officer, Major Joseph J. Taylor Jr. with the Legion of Merit for meritorious service. Colonel Matthews, Deputy Chief of Staff, 1st Signal Brigade, presented the award.

e. In recognition of individual efforts, members of the battalion have received the following number of awards/decorations since the battalion's arrival in Vietnam:

Silver Star	1
-------------	---

Bronze Star w/V Device	31
Bronze Star	102
Air Medal	6
Army Commendation Medal w/V Device	4
Army Commendation Medal w/1st Oak Leaf	6
Army Commendation Medal	126
Purple Heart	11

f. The restoration necessary from the TIT Offensive and the personnel shortage within the battalion have significantly affected the civic action program within the battalion. However, elements of the battalion were able to dig approximately 6000 holes for home foundations to aid refugees in a joint ROK-US-ARVN project in Saigon. A total of 15,000 piastras was donated to the Vinh Long Catholic School by personnel of this unit. The officers of the 69th Signal Battalion are supporting a 15 year old girl through high school by donating monthly for her support and schooling.

g. During this quarter, the battalion continued to participate in the "Buddy Battalion" program. As a result of this program, a joint project was undertaken on 26 March 1968 to eliminate all dead and unused cable from the Saigon/Cholon area. The results of this project have not only brought about more cooperation and understanding between the 69th Signal Battalion and the 600th Signal Battalion (ARVN), but have also served to rid the area of much unsightly salvage cable. On 27 April, the Battalion Consolidated Mess Hall, operated by A Company, was host to 35 enlisted personnel from the CMD Quartermaster School, Cook and Food Service Supervisory Class. These personnel were shown food preparation and handling, basic methods of food sanitation, and use and types of American cooking utensils. While this was not an assigned "Buddy Battalion", operations of this type do much to improve US-VN relations.

2. Operations: This quarter saw continued emphasis toward efficiently operating the most modern army communications equipment available in a combat zone.

a. Dial Central Offices:

(1) The only major change in the DCO's occurred at MACV. As a result of the rocket attacks in February 1968, MACV took immediate steps to protect the DCO by installing a $\frac{1}{2}$ " steel plating wall around the entire DCO. This plating will provide protection for all but a direct hit, and even then will serve to minimize damage.

(2) On 22 April 1968, the SB-249 switchboard, formerly used by the 593d Signal Company (Spt) for the VIP switchboard, was transferred to Regional Communications Group, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) in connection with 1st Signal Brigade CMO 11-68. The SB-249 presently in use at Saigon USO is to replace the VIP switchboard as soon as the commercial switchboard at the USO is completed.

b. Cable Construction: Cable construction efforts during the period were primarily directed at repair and restoration of major cables damaged during the TET Offensive and the period following. During this offensive several major cables in the Saigon/Cholon area were extensively damaged. Approximately 15 spans, or 1500 feet of cable from MACV to Phu Lam had to be replaced, and subsequently had to be repaired several times after the initial repair. Four other major cables as well as many minor cables were also extensively damaged and required continuing maintenance and replacement as a result of continued damage.

(1) The primary project for cable construction during this period has been Mission Order 69-68, the first phase of the elimination of the Lynx "B" Box. This mission order will eliminate a major, unsightly and vulnerable testing point in the Saigon area. Twelve other major mission orders were completed during this period.

(2) Cable installed to improve existing service in the Saigon/Cholon area totaled 52,087 feet of multi-pair cable of various sizes and 88 reels ($\frac{1}{4}$ mile each) of spiral four cable. Service improvements included the elimination of several truckloads of unsightly salvage cable (see Buddy Battalion para (1,g) from the Saigon/Cholon area.

c. Communications Center Operation: This reporting period has been marked by the consolidation of two commcenters and subsequent deactivation of one. One commcenter and a tape relay were relocated.

(1) On 25 February 1968, the Saigon Area Commcenter, which had previously operated out of a converted MSC-25 van on Camp Gaylor, was relocated to the USAHAC compound. Much improved working conditions, as well as improved communications efficiency, have resulted from this move.

(2) On 8 March 1968, the TASE and MIBARS Commcenters were consolidated under one commcenter - MIBARS - with the subsequent deactivation of the old TASE Site. This consolidation released five personnel for duty at other commcenters that were critically short of personnel.

(3) On 14 April 1968, the CICV Relay, formerly located on Camp Gaylor in a modified MSC-25 van, was moved to MACV and situated in the area formerly used by the J-2 commcenter. This move brought the CICV relay under the responsibility of the OIC MACV Commcenters. The improved working conditions resulting from this move have alleviated many personnel and operational problems experienced at the previous location.

d. Courier Operations:

(1) The publication of a new and improved USARV Regulation 66-1 has done much to alleviate problems of weight and type of material authorized in the courier system.

(2) Flight disruption due to enemy activity, particularly during the TET period was a major problem but has improved considerably since that period.

e. Data Terminal Facilities:

(1) On 24 April 1968, the common user AUTODIN terminal at MACV headquarters was officially activated in a ceremony on site. Colonel Vogt, Commanding Officer, 160th Signal Group, Colonel Shiflet, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, MACV J-6, Lieutenant Colonel Cameron, CE operations MACV J-6, and personnel of the 69th Signal Battalion were present for the ceremony. This AUTODIN terminal has already taken over the majority of the traffic from the Phu Lam station and has reduced the monthly service rate by 5% during its first week and a half of operation.

(2) The Data Management Agency Data Terminal has been almost completed and will be ready for acceptance testing in early May. It is presently scheduled to begin operation on 13 May.

f. Carrier (VHF) and Radio (HF) systems.

(1) The technical control facility at Site Octopus became operational on 12 February with the cutover of six circuits on system 77UHAL to the control board. System cutovers continued throughout the quarter and as commitments increased an additional board was added to help expansion. As of 30 April, only four major systems remained to be cutover. Site Octopus presently maintains control of 420 VH and VFTG circuits.

(2) On 4 March construction began on an AB-216 antenna tower at Site Octopus. The tower was completed in late March, and now reaches a height of 132 feet. The added antenna height gained by use of this tower has, without exception, increased signal levels and improved systems reliability.

(3) On 14 April control of the SB675, located at the microwave site near MACV, was transferred to the 327th Signal Company. This transfer allowed the 69th Signal Battalion to more effectively utilize personnel released and help relieve the critical personnel shortage at other sites.

(4) On 19 April the MARS station, operated by Signal Support Company, was relocated from the Stars and Stripes compound on Plantation Road to Camp Gaylor. This relocation enabled the MARS station to provide much better service to the personnel located on and around Tan Son Nhut.

(5) On 27 April the Master Complex site, operated by Signal Support Company was completely deactivated and all shelters and equipment were removed to Site Octopus. This move allowed consolidation of personnel and equipment and has greatly improved circuit control and testing procedures for those systems formerly located at Master Complex.

3. Training:

a. During this period the battalion has been unable to schedule familiarization firing on the Thu Duc Service School firing range because of the enemy situation around that area. However, most personnel received live fire familiarzation under combat conditions during the offensive.

b. During this quarter all company grade officers with less than five years total commissioned service, and selected warrant officers, have attended classes on such subjects as "cable splicing and trouble shooting", Radio Relay and Carrier", and other selected subjects. These classes are particularly helpful in providing junior officers with an appreciation of fellow officers particular communications mission.

c. Continued emphasis and command information classes bn subjects such as VD, narcotics and blackmarketing have served to make all personnel increasingly aware of specific problems encountered in Vietnam.

4. Personnel: While this battalion has mission requirements in excess of its mission personnel staffing, by the end of the quarter personnel strength was down to less than 100% MTOE strength. This has caused many problems with both defense af sites and continued operation with under strength companies. The large amount of E-4 promotions which became available in April has done much to improve morale of the battalion. However, the lack of promotions among senior NCO's continues to be a problem.

5. Logistics: During this period the battalion was able to turn in several hundred line items of equipment and supplies which are not mission essential. With this turn in, the S-4 warehouse, located in Cholon, was closed out and turned back to the leasing authorities.

6. Summary: This quarter has been highly eventful and has been characterized by continued improvements and consolidation of communications facilities. During this period the first real tests of the physical security of sites and base camp occurred. With minor adjustments and corrections, all sites proved to have sound defensive measures.

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Section II Commanders Observations
Evaluations and Recommendations

1. Personnel

a. Reenlistment Program

(1) Observation: During the last quarter, substantial difficulty occurred in the Reenlistment Program.

(2) Evaluation: One of the major factors involved was the RECAP program. This program has many benefits to offer the first term soldier in that it allows him to pick his assignment before he reenlists and guarantees him this assignment for at least one year after he returns to CONUS. However, what has occurred within this battalion is that the career counselor has talked to an individual, convinced him to reenlist under the RECAP program, requested the assignment, and then heard nothing. The man becomes discouraged after a delay and decides either not to re-enlist, or to wait until returning to CONUS.

(3) Recommendation: That individual career counselors in the command be authorized to coordinate directly with USARV for information on RECAP. USARV could then speed the entire system by consolidation of requests and expediting to DA. By eliminating Group and Brigade in this RECAP structure, speed is gained and a personal contact is developed between the career counselor and the agency in direct contact with DA. As an additional advantage, both Group and Brigade would not have to spend time processing applications for which they can take no action or exert any influence on.

2. Operations

a. Emergency Action Console Circuits

(1) Observation: The eight USARV EAC circuits to the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut area which utilize tactical microwave facilities, provide service to the subscriber that is, at best, marginal.

(2) Discussion: The EAC instruments utilize 2600 cycle tone-on-while-idle trunking equipment and any drifting of the microwave channel will interrupt the tone, thus causing false ring on the instrument. As the tactical microwave equipment has a history of frequent drifting, subscribers receive false ringing practically daily. This was initially a great source of complaint to MACV and Tiger DCO's, who could do nothing to correct the situation. Eventually, the subscribers tired of complaining and learned to live with the situation. However, when a legitimate call is received by these subscribers, communication is invariably sub-standard and frequently sub-marginal. All of these circuits require a

dis-proportionate amount of time on the part of MACV and Tiger repairmen, who must constantly realign the circuits with Long Binh. The circuit usefulness is questionable. A number of subscribers in question have requested that the circuits be removed. Five of the eight USARV subscribers are also subscribers of the MACV EAC and can gain access to the USARV system via the MACV EAC-USARV EAC common user trunks.

(3) Recommendation: That the USARV EAC circuits in the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut area should be rerouted by IWCS or deactivated. The disportionate amount of time spent on maintenance and troubleshooting these circuits could be used elsewhere to greater advantage.

b. Assigning Priorities to Inter-City Trunks.

(1) Observation: Presently, there are no priorities assigned to inter-city trunks. Consequently, they are sometimes pre-empted to restore circuits that do have priorities, but in actuality are not as important as the pre-empted circuits.

(2) Evaluation: The importance of the inter-city trunks has not been recognized and consequently, they have been pre-empted for communication facilities of lesser importance.

(3) Recommendation: That these trunks be evaluated in a realistic manner and assigned priorities consistant with their importance.

c. Improvement of Signal Levels.

(1) Observation: In many instances, raising antenna height would fail to show any appreciable gain in signal levels of marginal systems.

(2) Evaluation: It has been found that due to added coaxial cable necessary to raise antenna height, the loss was almost as great as the advantage gained by increased height. However, use of G-line coaxial cable proved far superior to standard coaxial cable and resulted in drastic increase in both receive signal and power output.

(3) Recommendation: That G-line be directed for use wherever possible for all AN/GRC-50 radio shots with marginal receive signal levels.

3. Training

a. Training of 36H20's on Stromberg XY Dial Equipment

(1) Observation: The majority of 36H personnel in the grades of E-4 and below arrive in Vietnam with inadequate background in XY dial equipment.

10.

(2) Evaluation: In the 36H course, only a relatively small portion of the course is spent on the Stromberg XY dial equipment. While there are many types of dial equipment, the majority of automatic dial offices in Vietnam consist of the Stromberg XY equipment. A significant number of the graduates of the course will be coming to Vietnam to be assigned to an XY office.

(3) Recommendation: That a larger portion of the 36H course be devoted to the Stromberg XY Dial Office.

b. Training of 31M20's on the AN/GRC-50 radio.

(1) Observation: The majority of the 31M personnel in the grades of E-4 and below arrive in Vietnam with inadequate background in the AN/GRC-50 radio.

(2) Evaluation: Recently a large number of 31M20 personnel arrived in country from the 31M20 course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. After questioning these men concerning their training, it appears they were given little or no training on the AN/GRC-50 radio.

(3) Recommendation: That a larger portion of the 31M course be devoted to training on the AN/GRC-50 radio.

c. Training for 36E personnel on Trouble Shooting

(1) Observation: 36E personnel (Cable Splicers) are not proficient in the use of the TS-26, TS-27 and other test sets.

(2) Evaluation: As a result of the TET offensive, many cables suffered bullet holes, causing trouble on only a few pairs and making it extremely difficult to locate the trouble by visual methods. Air Force splicers, working with splicers of this unit, were able to locate many problems through the use of test sets, thus saving much time and effort.

(3) Recommendation: That a refresher course for 36E personnel be initiated at the 1st Signal Brigade School, emphasizing use of test sets in trouble shooting. All future classes ~~on~~ cable splicing should include a larger block on trouble shooting, with emphasis on test set use.

4. Intelligence

a. Conflicting Intelligence Reports

(1) Observation: During and subsequent to the TET offensive, highly contradictory intelligence reports were received from several sources to include JDOC, CMD, and Embassy Intelligence.

(2) Evaluation: This continued reception of false information has led many personnel to be highly skeptical of all information received and thus use only half hearted efforts to stay prepared.

(3) Recommendation: That a central intelligence group for each area come up with one "estimation of the situation" and dispatch this daily via secure circuit, or at a central intelligence briefing, in the form of "INTSUM" to each unit in that area.

5. Logistics

a. Multi-pair cable damage due to wooden reels:


(1) Observation: Multi-pair cable is arriving in Vietnam with a high percentage of damaged cable.

(2) Evaluation: Multi-pair cable is being shipped to Vietnam on wooden reels which are very susceptible to breakage. The long distance involved and the large number of times these reels are handled results in an extremely high percentage of damaged cable arriving in country. In several cases, by the time it reached the using unit, the reels had been completely smashed and the cable was completely salvaged.

(3) Recommendation: That cable reels be redesigned with extensive reinforcing or aluminum reels be utilized.

6. Organization: None.

7. Other: None:



1 Incl
Organizational Instruction Chart

CHARLES E. KERN, JR.
Major, SigC
Acting Commander

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- 4-CO, 160th Sig Gp

SCCVUG-OP (14 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 69th Signal Battalion for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ, 160th Signal Group, APO 96491 30 MAY 1968

TO: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), ATTN: SCCVOP,
APO 96384

1. The following comments apply to information contained in paragraphs
as indicated:

a. Paragraph 1a of Section II. The problem concerning the Reenlistment Control Assignment Program (RECAF) was discussed in paragraph 5, USARV Reenlistment Newsletter, dated February 1968. As stated in that article, the RECAP Assignment Branch, Office of Personnel Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), was in the process of changing the operating procedures in an attempt to correct the problem. As predicted at that time, some difficulty would be experienced in the timely receipt of RECAF assignments for the immediate future. It was therefore directed that all requests more than sixty days old be resubmitted. This Group complied with that requirement. Subsequently, the 1st Signal Brigade career counselor went to each Group unit and discussed this and other aspects of the reenlistment programs. Timely receipt of assignment instructions was found to be the major consideration that was limiting the effectiveness of the RECAP program. In an attempt to correct the problem, 1st Signal Brigade personnel are working with USARV to establish procedures for direct telephonic follow-up with DA on requests for assignment instructions. Direct calls will be made sixty days after submission of each application in order to monitor the status of such requests. Implementation of these procedures should result in a more effective in-country reenlistment program.

b. Paragraph 2a of Section II. AN/TRC-29 microwave terminal equipment is inherently stable and is designed to provide a high quality voice frequency channel suitable for ring down, dial-to-dial, Emergency Action Console (EAC), and other types of telephone circuits. Fading on the microwave system will cause false rings at EAC subscriber instruments because these circuits are designed as "tone on while idle" circuits. Thus, the fading path causes an immediate fault alarm, and the subscriber will report the trouble immediately or else take the phone off the hook. Either of these actions will alert communications system operators of the existence of trouble in the system, which must be corrected. There have been few extended outages which were chargeable to poor quality microwave channels. In all instances of trouble on microwave channels, the application of proper maintenance and alignment procedures has restored the faulty channel. Some subscribers are given EAC circuits into both MACV and USARV EAC's in order to add redundancy to their communications service and thus

SOONUG-OP

30 MAY 1968

14

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 69th Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1)

increase overall reliability. There is no valid reason to deactivate or to reroute these circuits over IWGS at this time.

c. Paragraph 3b of Section II. To compensate for the insufficient training of operator personnel (MOS 31M) on pulse code modulation (PCM) equipment, the Southeast Asia Signal School (SEASS) has been conducting two nine-day classes monthly on the AN/TRC-110/117 and AN/GRC-50 equipment since January 1968. Eighty-seven enlisted men completed this training through 30 April 1968. Starting 3 June 1968, the number of classes will be doubled. However, to preclude the need for this formal training of replacement personnel, concur in the recommendation that more training on the AN/GRC-50 Radio Set be included in the MOS 31M course.

d. Paragraph 3c of Section II. The Cable Splicers Course at the Southeast Asia Signal School includes training on the use of the Test Set TS-352, which, like the TS-26, is also a volt-ohm meter. The course also includes training on the Test Set ZM-4. Both the ZM-4 and the TS-27 are Wheatstone Bridge test sets, but the ZM-4 is more precise in measurements. However, since the TS-26 and TS-27 are included in Table of Organization and Equipment for Telephone Operations Companies, the need to include training on these test sets in the cable splicers course will be re-evaluated.

e. Paragraph 5a of Section II. Review and inspection of shipments of multi-pair cable reveals that damage to cable and cable reels is extensive in many cases. It is recommended that the use of "land-sea express" (shipment in the same semi-trailers from manufacturer to in-country destination) be considered for shipment of communications cable.

2. Concur in the commander's observations, evaluations, and recommendations, except as amplified or modified above.

Blaine O. Vogt
BLAINE O. VOGT
Colonel, SigC
Commanding

15. SCCPV-OP-CR (14 May 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 69th Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM), APO SF 96384 18 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO SF 96375

1. Subject report is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 525-15.

2. Concur in the Commander's observations, evaluations, and recommendations as indorsed with the following comments:

a. Item: Lack of Promotions Among Senior NCO's, para.4, p.5. Senior NCO promotions continue to be a problem throughout the Brigade because of the nonavailability of allocations.

b. Item: Training of 36H20's on Stromberg XY Dial Equipment, Section II, 3a, p.7. In January 1968, the 36H course at Fort Monmouth was expanded. Three weeks of the course are now devoted to instruction on the XY exchange.

c. Item: Training of 31M20's on the AN/GRC-50 Radio, Section II, 3b, p.8, with paragraph 1c, 1st Indorsement. A message has been sent to the Signal School at Fort Gordon pertaining to this training. The AN/TRC-110/117 course at the Southeast Asia Signal School has been revised to include three days instruction on the AN/GRC-50.

3. Non-concur in the Commander's recommendations listed below with the following comments:

a. Item: Reenlistment Program, Section II, 1a, p.6, with paragraph 1a, 1st Indorsement. It is not feasible to have every battalion in contact with the USARV Recruiting Office due to the limited number of available personnel and telephone circuits. The problem concerning most first term enlisted and US personnel is that those concerned want to make a decision to stay in the service at the last moment and the time frame is then too short to process applications in time for reenlistment before DEROS. This headquarters concurs in the Group Commander's comments with the correction that direct calls can no longer be made between USARV and Department of the Army. This must be done through message or courier pouch.

b. Item: Assigning Priorities to Inter-City Trunks, Section II, 2b, p.7. Whenever inter-office trunks are installed over Army Area or DCS facilities, they are assigned restoration priorities in accordance with the JCS Restoration Priority System. This provides that in common user trunk groups, the fourth trunk, and all other trunks in excess of four, are assigned a restoration priority of 4B, thus making them vulnerable to preemption. When inter-office trunks are installed over cable they

SCCPV-OP-CR (14 May 68)

13 JUN 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 69th Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) 16.

are not normally given a restoration priority. Then any preemption is under the control of the organization which operates the office where the cable is terminated. In this case trunks should be given preference over subscriber lines which normally share the cable.

c. Item: Improvement of Signal Levels, Section II, 2c, p.7. The AN/GRC-50 operates in two frequency ranges: low band - 601.55-999.5 MHz and high band - 1350.5-1849.5 MHz. The CG-1013/U transmission line assembly is designed for optimum operation in the 1700 MHz to 2400 MHz range as part of the AN/TRC-29 configuration. There is only a small overlap in these frequencies and consequently greater loss should be expected when operating a G-line in the lower frequency range than when operating in the higher range. Another consideration is the fact that each launcher used with the G-line contributes about 1 db loss regardless of the length of the line. Therefore, G-line is not desirable for short runs of transmission line. Whereas there may be many cases where the employment of the G-line improves the system, personnel considering its use should realize the limitations imposed by the factors discussed in that it is not an ultimate solution for all marginal systems.

d. Item: Training for 36E Personnel on Trouble Shooting, Section II, 3c, p.8 with paragraph 1d, 1st Indorsement. The cable splicer course at the Southeast Asia Signal School includes training on the use of Test Sets TS-352, ZM-4, ZM-21. For measuring, this equipment is more precise than the TS-26 or TS-27. This headquarters concurs with the Group Commander's comments.

e. Item: Conflicting Intelligence Reports. Section II, 4a, p.8. Although it is highly desirable to have a centralized point of intelligence dissemination, this desirable characteristic is unobtainable in the present Vietnam situation. Even though intelligence reports are occassionally conflicting, each one must be evaluated on its own merits and it is at all times the responsibility of the commander to ensure the full participation of his personnel in the preparation for the defense of his command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

M H Smith
MERRELL H. SMITH
LTC, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

SCCPV-OP-CR (14 May 68)

13 JUN 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 69th Signal Battalion for
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Copy furnished:

Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications Command,
ATTN: SCCOP, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 85613

AVHGC-DST (14 May 68) 3d Ind CPT Arnold/dls/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 69th Signal Battalion for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

18.

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

24 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 69th Signal Battalion.

2. Reference item concerning multi-pair cable damage due to wooden reels, page 9, paragraph 5a; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1e: Concur. The ECOM Field Office has been apprised of this problem and have been requested to investigate and determine if damage was caused due to faulty packaging or if it is by mishandling during shipping. Also a message is being prepared and will be transmitted to USARPAC apprising them of the problem and requesting that future shipments of multi-pair cable be made by use of Sea Land container system if possible. The use of this system will reduce the number of times that the packages are handled and should result in less damage to the cable.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



JOHN V. GETCHELL
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:

HQ 69th Sig Bn

HQ 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM)

19
GPOP-DT (14 May 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 69th Sig Bn for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 20 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference (page 12) 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3a: The following
action has been taken to expedite the processing of requests for re-
enlistment options:

a. USARPAC Regulation 601-280 authorizes the use of available
telephone communications to request reenlistment options from Department
of the Army.

b. Information and guidance on counseling prospective reenlistees
and submitting reenlistment option requests have been published in the
July 1968 Command Reenlistment Newsletter, attached at Inclosure 2.—W/D
Hqs, DA.


c. USARPAC reenlistment personnel will conduct a staff visit to
US Army, Vietnam during the 2d Quarter, FY 1969, to review reenlistment
operations and provide assistance in solving local problems when
necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. Shortt

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV



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21		Abstract & Summary	
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23 The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE _____

** FOR OT RD # _____

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ITEM 2

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ITEM 3

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ITEM 5

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PAGE # _____

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** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

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